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ABSTRACT—Over the last twenty years, domestic asset protection trusts 
have risen in popularity as a means of estate planning and asset protection. 
A domestic asset protection trust is an irrevocable trust formed under state 
law which enables an independent trustee to allocate money to a class of 
persons, which includes the settlor. 
 Since Alaska first enacted domestic asset protection legislation in 
1997, fifteen states have followed its lead. The case law over the last 
twenty years addressing these trust mechanisms has, however, been 
surprisingly sparse. A Washington bankruptcy court decision, In re Huber, 
altered this drought, but caused more confusion by holding that a public 
policy exception trumped standard choice of law analysis. The end result: 
The court applied the law of the settlor’s state, which prohibited these 
trusts, rather than the law of Alaska, where the trust actually originated. 
 This Note argues that the Huber decision was wrongly decided and 
provides a framework for future courts considering the choice of law issues 
related to domestic asset protection trusts. This Note also demonstrates that 
economic, public policy, and federalism considerations support the choice 
of law outcome. 
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Imagine this: You recently started a new small business, you managed 
to acquire several million dollars, and you are now contemplating how to 
best protect your assets, not only for yourself, but also for your children 
and grandchildren. Or perhaps you are a doctor, a lawyer, or a businessman 
and are worried about shielding your money against potential future 
creditors because of the personal liability present in your profession or 
trade. Twenty years ago, you would have been allowed only one option—to 
place your money in an offshore self-settled trust1 in a jurisdiction like the 
Cayman or Cook Islands.2 
In 1997, however, the first American self-settled asset protection trust 
was born in Alaska, and since then, fifteen additional states have followed 
	
1 A self-settled asset protection trust is an irrevocable trust in which the person who creates the 
trust (the settlor) is also the beneficiary of the trust. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 704 (9th ed. 2013). 
2 See id. at 704–05 (discussing the recognition of asset protection trusts in several offshore 
jurisdictions); see also discussion infra Section I.C. While no empirical study exists, scholars have 
estimated that the value of offshore self-settled trusts currently exceeds one trillion dollars. Ritchie W. 
Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: “The Estate Planning Tool of the Decade” or a Charlatan?, 
13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998) (stating that it was estimated more than one trillion dollars of trust 
funds were in asset protection trusts in foreign jurisdictions alone). 
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suit.3 You may now choose between settling in one of sixteen domestic 
jurisdictions or elect to put your money in one of the many available 
offshore jurisdictions.4 Intuitively, the choice appears an easy one: Why put 
your money in the Cayman Islands when you can put it in South Dakota or 
Alaska?5 Not only will your trust business stay in the United States, but you 
can also avoid the obvious risks of transferring your money outside the 
country.6 Unfortunately, what should be a simple decision has become 
anything but simple as a result of the risk that courts will refuse to enforce 
these new trust instruments.7 
While self-settled asset protection trusts, known as domestic asset 
protection trusts in the United States, had their onshore genesis in 1997, it 
took over fifteen years for a domestic court to consider their 
enforceability.8 The only case to speak to the enforceability of a domestic 
	
3 DAVID G. SHAFTEL, ACTEC COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST 
STATUTES, at I (2015), http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-Domestic-Asset-
Protection-Trust-Statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV5U-9JJ9]. For a discussion on the current climate of 
self-settled asset protection states, see Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2006). 
4  See Matthew Russo, Comment, Asset Protection: An Analysis of Domestic and Offshore Trust 
Accounts, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 265, 279–91 (2014) (discussing the evolution of current law 
regarding both offshore and domestic trust instruments, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of 
each). 
5 See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 515 (2000) (noting that choosing a domestic trust over an offshore one has 
the obvious benefits of avoiding the uncertainties that flow from transferring assets to a jurisdiction 
with different language, political and legal structure, and currency); Darsi Newman Sirknen, Domestic 
Asset Protection Trusts: What’s the Big Deal?, 8 TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 133, 136 (2006) 
(discussing the benefits that flow into the United States economy by choosing domestic trusts over 
offshore instruments and that “the United States is unquestionably more politically and economically 
stable than any of the offshore [domestic asset protection trust] host countries”). 
6 See Ellen C. Auwarter, Note, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Cayman Islands: Solution 
to International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations?, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 680, 680–87 
(1986) (analyzing the sovereignty and conflict of laws issues facing offshore jurisdictions); Paul M. 
Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move “Offshore” Trusts onto the 
Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999) (discussing the risks of transferring money to 
foreign countries). 
7 Historically, offshore trusts have provided much better protection than domestic asset protection 
trusts. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 56–66 (1994) (discussing the strengths of offshore trusts in places like the 
Bahamas and Cook Islands in comparison with the problems presented by domestic trusts); Robert T. 
Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 309–10 (2002) 
(highlighting common features of an offshore asset protection trust compared with the current evolution 
of domestic trust law, and concluding that myriad problems face domestic versus offshore settlors). 
8  Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 807–09 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). By this, I 
mean enforceability of a trust by a settlor from a jurisdiction which does not have domestic asset 
protection trust laws who places their money in trust in one of the states that does. However, it should 
be noted that several courts have considered the enforceability of offshore asset protection trusts. See, 
e.g., Lawrence v. Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 279 F.3d 1294, 1298–301 (11th Cir. 2002); FTC v. 
Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239–44 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, courts have also 
considered choice of law principles in spendthrift trusts. See, e.g., Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 
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asset protection trust is In re Huber, in which a Washington bankruptcy 
court first addressed the broader choice of law question in a decision 
involving a Washington settlor who created a self-settled trust under 
Alaska law.9 The court determined that Washington law, not Alaska law, 
should apply to determine the validity of the Alaskan trust.10 Applying 
Washington law, the court found that the trust violated Washington’s 
public policy against self-settled trusts, rendering the trust unenforceable.11 
While no appellate court has yet considered this question, it is only a matter 
of time before one does. 
Accordingly, this Note will address the choice of law12 issues raised 
when dealing with domestic asset protection trusts, but will part company 
with the Huber court’s application and analysis of these choice of law 
principles. More specifically, this Note will argue that Huber incorrectly 
applied choice of law principles as a matter of law, as well as through the 
normative law and economics perspective of jurisdictional competition. 
First, this Note demonstrates that the choice of law analysis must not 
overlook one of the most important tenets of trust law: trustor intent.13 In 
most cases, not only does the trustor intend for the trust to be governed 
under the law of the favorable jurisdiction, but the trustor also typically 
includes a provision in the contract which explicitly designates a particular 
jurisdiction.14 Second, this Note establishes that both Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws §§ 270 and 273 weigh heavily in favor of enforcing 
domestic asset protection trusts.15 Third, this Note demonstrates that not 
only was Huber incorrectly decided, but public policy actually favors the 
	
217 B.R. 98, 101–03 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998); Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 
201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
9 Huber, 493 B.R. at 807–09. 
10 Id. at 808–09. 
11 Id. at 809. 
12 Essentially, choice of law principles ask, “Which law should apply?” When there is a difference 
between multiple jurisdictions with some connection to a case, a court can either apply the law of the 
forum state or the law of the site of the transaction or happening which gave rise to the litigation. In this 
instance, we will consider the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws since 
it has consistently been the main consideration used in court decisions on the instant issue and related 
issues in the offshore context. See, e.g., id. at 807; Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697–98; Ferrari v. Barclays 
Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 384, 385–88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 10, topic 2 intro. note (AM. LAW. INST. 
1971) (noting that the chief purpose of trust law is to carry out the intent of the trustor). 
14 See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset 
Protection Trust Market and the Wealth that Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 839 (1999) 
(“To create this ideal trust a settlor transfers his assets into trust, names himself as a beneficiary, 
includes a provision that the trust holdings may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated prior to 
distribution, and appoints as trustee either himself or a third party over whom he retains certain 
powers.” (emphasis added)).  
15 See discussion infra Part III. 
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legality of these trusts.16 Amongst other reasons, there are already 
mechanisms in place by which individuals can legally protect assets that do 
not violate public policy. For example, tenancy by the entirety17 and 
homestead exemptions18 already allow individuals to legally shield their 
property from creditors.19 Domestic asset protection laws merely tip the 
scales back towards the beneficiaries. 
Moreover, the Huber court’s misapplication of these principles within 
the broader context of domestic asset protection trusts will invite 
unforeseen and potentially devastating collateral damage, including a 
detrimental impact on current notions of interstate federalism. Specifically, 
this Note asserts that, by putting a chokehold on settlors who create 
domestic asset protection trusts through the mechanism of choice of law 
rules, courts ignore both the constitutional underpinnings and the economic 
benefits of interstate federalism—particularly the financial importance of 
interstate competition. 
For all the aforementioned reasons, this Note will preemptively 
debunk any suggestion that Huber should become the standard-bearer for 
determining the enforceability of future domestic asset protection trusts.20 
Accordingly, Part I traces the evolution of trust law, from the advent of 
trusts to the development of domestic asset protection trust statutes. Part II 
outlines the facts, reasoning, and holding of the only case to directly 
address domestic asset protection trusts: In re Huber. Part III analyzes 
Huber within the broader framework of choice of law and domestic asset 
protection trusts, highlighting the logical and legal flaws in its reasoning. 
Part IV argues that, as more cases like Huber arise around the country, 
courts should recognize the benefits of enforcing these trusts—not look for 
reasons to minimize enforceability. A brief conclusion will follow. 
	
16 While public policy is a somewhat amorphous concept, something typically runs in concert with 
public policy when it is in the interest of the state that it be performed. See discussion infra 
Section IV.A. 
17 This concerns only jurisdictions that allow shielding of property from the creditors of one 
spouse. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100–01 (2009). 
18 A homestead exemption protects a certain portion of a home’s value from tax. See id.; Anup 
Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1294–97 (2008). 
19 See John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset 
Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2621, 2668 (2006); Stern, supra note 17, at 1100–01. 
20 As Professors Max Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff observe, many scholars, from several 
vantage points, have argued that domestic asset protection trusts are unenforceable. Robert H. Sitkoff & 
Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of 
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 384 n.88 (2005); see, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset 
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000). This Note 
argues to the contrary. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of Trust Law 
The choice of law flaws in Huber can only be understood through the 
prism of both trust law generally and the progression of the trust landscape 
in the United States. Functionally, a trust is an arrangement by which 
assets, whether tangible or intangible,21 are split and held by different 
persons—whereby a trustee manages the assets as a fiduciary for one or 
more beneficiaries.22 The trustee holds legal title to the trust property, 
which in most cases means full autonomy to manage the property in trust.23 
The beneficiaries hold equitable title, meaning they are authorized to 
receive payments from the trust income or corpus.24 
American trust law can be traced back to the thirteenth century, when 
the Franciscan friars first arrived in England.25 Because the friars were not 
permitted to own property, land was conveyed to other individuals and held 
for the use of the friars.26 While this system thrived for several years, 
laymen began taking advantage of the process in order to avoid certain 
compulsory legal obligations of a property’s legal titleholder.27 By 
transferring legal title to another person, but preserving the trust, persons 
who broke the law or made risky investments could prevent the forfeiture 
of their trust property.28 
In 1535, Parliament enacted the Statute of Uses, recognizing the fact 
that trusts had predominantly become “instruments of fraud” and intending 
to thwart their further abuse.29 While the Statute eliminated many trust uses, 
	
21 For example, an intangible asset might be a patent, copyright, or other form of intellectual 
property. See George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 
1179 (1987). 
22 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 385.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. The corpus of a trust is the sum of money or property placed into the instrument and set aside 
for beneficiaries. See John Bourdeau et al., Devise, Bequest, Inheritance, or Trust Income, 85 C.J.S. 
TAXATION § 1866, Westlaw (database updated September 2016).  
25 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 386. 
26 M.D. LAMBERT, FRANCISCAN POVERTY 84 (1961); Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the 
Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (1996). 
27 Avini, supra note 26, at 1144. The English common law of property contained several 
limitations including general restrictions on holding legal title to land and inter vivos conveyances of 
property, and a complete prohibition on post mortem transfers. Id. at 1143. 
28 Id. at 1144–45. 
29 Id. at 1145–46. Many have argued that the object of the statute was to destroy the monasteries 
and confiscate their property, and the best way to accomplish this was to abolish trusts. See GEORGE 
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4, at 11 (5th. 
ed. 1973). For the political history surrounding the Statute of Uses, see W.S. Holdsworth, The Political 
Causes Which Shaped the Statute of Uses, 26 HARV. L. REV. 108 (1912). 
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it spoke only to real property.30 Therefore, utilizing trusts to protect 
personal property was regarded as a permissible trust use.31 These trusts, 
which survived the Statute of Uses, then became the origin of modern trust 
law.32 
B. Trust Law Moves to America 
The thirteen original states, which generally adopted the English 
common law, also adopted the English structure and substance of equity 
jurisprudence, which incorporated the law of trusts.33 Over time, however, 
American trust law began to separate from English trust law in several 
notable aspects.34 One key distinction was the importance of “dead hand” 
control in American trust law.35 American trust law sought to allow more 
control from the grave than did its English predecessor, where intent of the 
trustor ruled.36 The spendthrift trust was one such example.37 
	
30 See 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535) (Eng.), in 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 539–42 (1817). 
31 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 5, at 12. For example, a gift to A for five years, 
intended for the use of B, was not affected by the Statute. Id. 
32 See Avini, supra note 26, at 1143–47 (noting that the evolution of trusts converged with the 
passage of the Statute of Uses). 
33 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 6, at 14. It should be noted, however, that the 
development of equity jurisprudence was initially “slow and difficult” in the United States. Id. Still, 
despite other legal deficiencies and a dearth of domestic precedent in early America, trust litigation was 
relatively prevalent. Id.; see, e.g., Bacon v. Taylor, 1 Kirby 368 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1788); State ex rel. 
Hindman v. Reed, 4 H. & McH. 6 (Md. Ct. Ch. 1797).  
34 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1193–1201 (1985) (describing the evolution of and ultimately separation of 
American and English trust law, with a specific description on spendthrift trusts). 
35 Dead hand control is the ability to use wealth to influence certain behavior after death. See 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE 
LAW 4 (2009). American law, like other modern legal systems, recognizes the right of the dying to 
decide how their money will be allocated. Id. at 46. However, unlike other legal systems, American 
trust jurisprudence has placed a higher level of deference on the amount of testator freedom. See 
Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 963 (2006). To see arguments for and against 
limitations on dead hand control, compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 
1789) in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3–4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (“‘[T]hat the earth 
belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”), and RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, at 554–56, § 18.7, at 548 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing, 
through an example, that fully embracing dead hand control would be “wholly devoid of an economic 
foundation” because there must be room for some flexibility), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The controlling 
consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s 
intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”). 
36 According to Professors Dukeminier and Sitkoff, “in England and the Commonwealth . . . after a 
trust becomes irrevocable, the trust property is regarded as belonging to the beneficiaries, and the dead 
hand continues to rule only by sufferance of the beneficiaries.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, 
at 718. However, in America, it is the settlor who is seen as controlling—even from the grave. See id. at 
719. 
37 Id. at 719. 
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A spendthrift trust is created for purposes of protecting the trust 
corpus while allowing the trust beneficiary to receive trust income.38 As 
American trust law evolved and expanded, trusts played a prominent role in 
avoiding creditors.39 The spendthrift trust became immensely popular 
because it was an instrument that served to do just that.40 
The following hypothetical highlights the legal leap accomplished 
through the development of enforceable spendthrift trusts.41 Assume a 
father wants to make a gift of money to his daughter. If the gift is made in a 
single payment, his daughter can go out immediately and spend that 
money. If the payment is made over time, his daughter can only spend the 
income as the stream of money comes in—though she could also sell her 
annuity for the present value and have access to a lump sum. In both cases, 
however, a creditor could easily gain access to the daughter’s sum of 
money gifted by her father. By putting the money in a spendthrift trust, the 
father could make a gift to his daughter while assuring both that she could 
not alienate that trust interest and that no creditor could reach her interest. 
Simply put, it is one of the ultimate means of protecting wealth. 
In essence, a spendthrift trust is a trust that includes specific 
provisions that prohibit the beneficiary from voluntarily alienating their 
interest, but which also bars attachment by creditors.42 For example, a 
spendthrift provision prevents the beneficiary from using the trust 
instrument as collateral on a loan.43 Additionally, a creditor can only reach 
the beneficiary’s trust assets once a distribution has been made.44 The 
	
38 See id. at 694–98. 
39 Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 438 (1998) (analyzing the functions of the law of trusts and 
asserting that protecting one’s assets from creditors is one of the most significant contributions of trust 
law). 
40 See Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An 
Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 772 (2002) (stating that settlors started to place 
spendthrift provisions in their trusts to keep creditors of their beneficiaries from squandering their 
interests).  
41 This hypothetical is adopted from a similar hypothetical and explanation of spendthrift trusts. See 
Michael Sjuggerud, Comment, Defeating the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust in Bankruptcy, 28 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 977, 979 (2001). 
42 Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the Settlor, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 203, 203 n.1 (1930). Some state courts, however have relaxed such restraints on 
voluntary alienation and have allowed attachment by creditors in some situations, such as fraudulent 
conveyances. Id. at 203 & n.1, 203–04. 
43 Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Comment, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15 WYO. 
L. REV. 551, 555 (2015). 
44 Id. 
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creditor cannot place a lien on the trust instrument or otherwise access the 
trust assets.45 
Two late nineteenth-century cases contributed to the widespread 
acceptance of the spendthrift trust in the United States.46 In the most 
important of these cases, Nichols v. Eaton, the Supreme Court laid the 
groundwork for the extensive recognition of spendthrift trusts as a legal 
mechanism for protecting beneficiaries from the legitimate entitlements of 
their creditors.47 In Nichols, Justice Miller argued: 
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property 
in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills 
of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or 
incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily 
perceived.48 
Justice Miller’s assertion was the first instance in which a court specifically 
addressed the notion, and legality, of a spendthrift trust.49 Although many 
supported Justice Miller’s viewpoint,50 the idea was not without its share of 
critics,51 nor did it gain immediate traction.52 Still, the Nichols decision 
proved to be the foundation of legitimacy for the concept.53 Over the next 
	
45 Id. 
46 See Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 
(1882). 
47 91 U.S. at 725–27. Interestingly, the case itself did not concern a spendthrift trust, yet Justice 
Miller saw an opportunity, in dicta, to discuss their validity. See John K. Eason, Developing the Asset 
Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 39 (2002). 
48 Nichols, 91 U.S. at 727. Additionally, Justice Miller emphasized the power and ownership rights 
of the donor: 
[T]he doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing of it, cannot 
so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing in return, must hold it 
subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon deprive him of all the benefits sought 
to be conferred by the testator’s affection or generosity, is one which we are not prepared to 
announce as the doctrine of this court. 
Id. at 725. 
49 See Eason, supra note 47, at 41–42. 
50 See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Brown, Spendthrift Trusts, 54 CENT. L.J. 382, 393 (1902) (asserting that 
spendthrift trusts do not conflict with public policy); George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts 
Which Are Miscalled “Spendthrift Trusts” Reexamined, 22 CALIF. L. REV., 471, 480 (1934) (arguing in 
favor of a progressive attitude toward spendthrift trusts, in line with Nichols). 
51 See, e.g., John Chipman Gray, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at iii–iv (1883) 
(outlining objections to the adoption of spendthrift trust laws).  
52 See Eason, supra note 47, at 41 n.73 (noting that while Nichols set the groundwork for the 
spendthrift trust doctrine, the subsequent state court decision Broadway National Bank and other 
dynamics ultimately were the driving force behind its acceptance).  
53 Nichols continues to influence state court approaches to difficult spendthrift trust issues. See 
Scott v. Bank One Tr. Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio 1991) (relying on the reasoning in Nichols, 
specifically Justice Miller’s freedom of disposition argument, as the rationale for why Ohio precedent 
disfavoring spendthrift trusts should be rejected); see also Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cty., 
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quarter of a century, an overwhelming majority of state legislatures and 
courts eventually acknowledged the enforceability of spendthrift 
provisions.54 As it stands today, spendthrift provisions have found universal 
approval in all fifty states.55 As spendthrift trusts began to garner 
widespread acceptance, the debate shifted to specific issues within the law 
of spendthrift trusts.56 One of the most controversial of those issues became 
self-settled spendthrift trusts. 
C. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts 
Although the majority of jurisdictions in the United States now 
recognize some form of spendthrift trust, this recognition does not 
generally extend to spendthrift trusts created by and for the settlor.57 That 
is, a trust is considered void if a portion of the beneficial interest is held for 
the creator of the trust.58 This standard is based on the policy concern that 
property owners could mislead creditors by allocating money for their own 
needs before paying back creditors.59 Historically, courts saw a 
philosophical divide between those property owners seeking to provide 
economically for their family and property owners looking to “protect 
themselves against their own profligacy, at the expense of their creditors.”60 
	
704 So. 2d 1020, 1025–27 (Miss. 1997) (noting that Nichols laid the foundation for the strongest 
arguments in favor of enforcing spendthrift trusts before ultimately rejecting enforcement based on 
particular facts). 
54 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(2)(E) 
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010–180 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:9–11 (West 2016); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 5801.04(B) (West 2016).  
55 See HELENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, at 421 (3d ed. 2007) (outlining the multitude of spendthrift trust 
provisions, along with their exceptions, in all fifty states). However, states have set a variety of 
limitations on the enforcement of spendthrift provisions. See id.; see, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 
(2016) (making an exception for “[a]limony or maintenance of a person whom the beneficiary is 
obligated to support” and necessary services); Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282, 288 (Or. 1960) 
(holding that the application of a spendthrift clause to an ex-wife’s alimony was against the state’s 
public policy). 
56 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 697 (“The policy debate in contemporary times 
[about spendthrift trusts] has shifted to the question of whether to make exceptions for certain classes of 
creditors, such as spouses and children or tort victims.”). 
57 Griswold, supra note 42, at 203. 
58 See, e.g., Wenzel v. Powder, 59 A. 194, 195 (Md. 1904); State ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co., 
190 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944). Not only did the case law prohibit self-settled trusts, but 
there was statutory agreement as well. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15304 (West 2016); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 2016). 
59 See Griswold, supra note 42, at 203–04. 
60 Sterk, supra note 20, at 1044; see Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
image of a wise and benevolent person seeking to provide for a foolish and impulsive loved one 
supersedes the values which generally require that creditors be able to have access to debtors’ assets 
and allows for spendthrift trusts. However, this image of benevolent paternalism is absent when the 
settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary.” (citations omitted)). 
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To hold otherwise, many courts reasoned, would give speculative business 
owners a vehicle to mislead creditors.61 Stated another way, many creditors 
reasonably rely on the settlor’s apparent income, and could be deceived 
into believing in the settlor’s financial stability when, in fact, he has no 
assets outside of the protected trust.62 
Under this logic, courts and jurisdictions for nearly a century 
concluded that the benefits of self-paternalism do not offset its costs.63 
Until the 1980s, settlors searching for maximum asset protection were thus 
forced to take their chances by creating a spendthrift trust in which the 
beneficiary was some person other than the settlor.64 
Beginning in the mid- to late-1980s, however, several offshore 
jurisdictions began to recognize an innovative method65 of attracting trust 
business: opening their doors to those individuals looking for asset 
protection against creditors through the use of self-settled asset protection 
trusts.66 These offshore jurisdictions passed legislation which provided that 
judgments rendered by foreign courts were not enforceable against the self-
settled trusts, or against the settlor, trust, or beneficiaries.67 While no 
reliable empirical study exists, it is estimated that one trillion dollars of 
assets moved offshore after the implementation of these favorable self-
settled trust laws.68 
	
61 See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 155–56 (6th ed. 1987).  
62 Id.  
63 See, e.g., Pitrat, 947 F.2d at 424 (stating that the benefits of spendthrift trusts created for persons 
other than the settlor must be differentiated from benefits afforded the settlor in a self-settled trust); 
Arizona Bank v. Morris, 435 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), modified, 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1968) (asserting that inherent fairness concerns offset potential benefits accruing to the settlor).  
64 Still, two problems arise with this strategy. First, the settlor risks running afoul of a fraudulent 
transfer law—which are in place in most jurisdictions—by attempting to disguise who truly receives the 
beneficial interest. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2014). Thus, if a person engaged in business activities where claims are likely (for example, 
providing legal or medical services), future creditors may have a fraudulent transfer claim. Sterk, supra 
note 20, at 1047. Second, a settlor cannot circumvent the traditional self-settled spendthrift trust rule by 
selecting a beneficiary who is the settlor in fact, while not in name. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 1957). “If a person furnishes the consideration for the creation of 
a trust, he is the settlor.” Id. § 156 cmt. f, reporter’s notes. In these situations, a creditor can still access 
the trust instrument. 
65 At this point, offshore jurisdictions already provided trust outlets in the form of tax havens. See 
Sterk, supra note 20, at 1047–48; Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the 
Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 679 (1982). 
66 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 704–05 (listing the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook 
Islands, and many other offshore jurisdictions); see, e.g., International Trusts Act 1984 § 13C (Cook 
Is.); Fraudulent Dispositions Law 1989 § 4 (Cayman Is.); Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991 § 4 (Bah.). 
67 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 704–05. 
68 Taylor, supra note 2, at 164.  
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Although these jurisdictions saw an influx of business following the 
new legislation, the lingering question of the trusts’ enforceability 
remained. One of the first notable cases to consider their impact in the 
United States involved two media defendants that went bankrupt serving as 
owners and telemarketers of certain products and were not able to return 
the assured yields to their investors.69 The Federal Trade Commission filed 
a lawsuit, alleging a Ponzi scheme in violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.70 The defendants, however, had placed their money in an 
offshore protection trust located in the Cook Islands, and the offshore 
trustee had strict orders not to repatriate the assets if the beneficiaries were 
under duress.71 When the defendants would not repatriate the assets, they 
were held in contempt and taken into custody.72 After serving six months in 
custody, the defendants were released and ultimately settled with the 
Commission.73 While the court was not able to reach the offshore assets, 
the court’s power to incarcerate did earn the plaintiffs some recompense. 
Similarly, in In re Portnoy, a New York bankruptcy court faced the 
question of whether self-settled assets located in offshore trusts in the 
Jersey Channel Islands were property of the estate under the bankruptcy 
code or excluded from the estate entirely.74 In that case, the debtor formed a 
self-settled trust in the Jersey Channel Islands, declaring in the trust 
instrument that Jersey law had jurisdiction over the trust.75 Engaging in a 
choice of law analysis concerning the offshore and onshore jurisdictions—
in this case the Jersey Channel Islands and New York—the court stated: 
Whereas under normal circumstances parties are free to designate what state’s 
or nation’s law will govern their rights and duties, where another state or 
nation has a dominant interest in the transaction at issue, and the designated 
law offends a fundamental policy of that dominant state, the court may refuse 
to apply the foreign law.76 
	
69 FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1999). 
70 Id. at 1231, 1232. 
71 Id. at 1232. 
72 Id. at 1233. 
73 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 712. 
74 201 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 699. However, at least one scholar has argued that merging international and domestic 
choice of law analysis incorrectly conflates what should be a separate inquiry. See Douglas Laycock, 
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259 (1992) (arguing that “[i]t is a serious mistake to discuss domestic and 
international choice-of-law cases interchangeably” because international law is derived from different 
sources and international choice of law requires more flexibility). 
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The court determined it would not use the law of the offshore 
jurisdiction simply because the settlor “incorporat[ed] a favorable choice of 
law provision into a self-settled trust of which he is the primary 
beneficiary.”77 Applying § 270 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws, the court went on to hold that self-settled trusts violated the public 
policy of New York law and were invalid because the domestic jurisdiction 
had a greater interest in the issue at hand than the foreign jurisdiction.78 
Consequently, the court ultimately refused to enforce the self-settled 
spendthrift provisions and allowed creditors to reach the assets.79 
D. The Domestic Self-Settled Asset Protection Trust 
In 1997, self-settled asset protection trusts finally made their onshore 
debut in the form of an innovative Alaska statute.80 This statute allowed 
settlors to create an irrevocable trust that would make distributions to a 
class of beneficiaries which, unlike prior state laws, would allow 
allocations to the settlor.81 Later that year, Delaware became the second 
state to enact legislation allowing self-settled asset protection trusts, 
affirming that it “intended to maintain [its] role as the most favored 
domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.”82 Following in Alaska 
and Delaware’s footsteps, fourteen additional states have passed legislation 
allowing self-settled asset protection trusts.83 While each state statute 
captures the essence of a self-settled trust, legislatures have taken different 
	
77 Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 701.  
78 Id. at 698.  
79 Id. at 701. Two cases followed in the footsteps of Portnoy, using similar reasoning to arrive at 
the same outcome. See Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101–02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) 
(stating that, even though Bermuda choice of law was more advantageous to the debtor, Connecticut 
law must operate when there are overriding public policy implications); Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re 
Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 912, 912 n.10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that though the debtor 
amended the trust document to incorporate a self-settled spendthrift provision for the Republic of 
Mauritius, he could not use the provision as a shield against creditors because of the public policy in the 
onshore jurisdiction).  
80 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (1997). Trust attorneys in Alaska who noticed the flight of 
capital to offshore jurisdictions created the first domestic asset protection trust law, thinking that by 
enacting a domestic asset protection trust, they could capture at least a small slice of the self-settled 
trust market. See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate 
Planning: North to Alaska, TR. & ESTS., Sept. 1997, at 48. 
81 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (1997). 
82 Synopsis of Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, H.B. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del. Laws 
452 (1997). 
83 Although different jurisdictions have adopted slightly distinct statutes, their purpose remains the 
same. For an overview of the state statutes which allowed domestic self-settled asset protection trusts as 
of September 2015, see SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I. The current states that allow these self-settled 
trusts are Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at i–iv. 
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approaches regarding the protection, burden of proof, and statute of 
limitation exceptions for potentially fraudulent actions.84 
Although the first domestic asset protection trust was enacted in 1997, 
there has been a dearth of litigation questioning the general enforceability 
of any of these statutes.85 There are several possible explanations for this. 
First, it is possible, though unlikely, that there simply have not been any 
potential creditors or litigants that needed to challenge the enforceability of 
a self-settled asset protection trust. The second, more likely, possibility is 
that most settlors who—arguably—have wrongly avoided creditors 
typically either pay the money owed or settle the dispute without the cost of 
lengthy litigation. Finally, it is also possible that courts have made a 
concerted effort to avoid making any decisions on domestic asset 
protection trust enforceability, hoping that the debate, especially pertaining 
to public policy issues, would play out in state legislatures.86 Nonetheless, 
regardless of the underlying reason for the lack of litigation on the issue, 
until 2013, no court had explicitly determined whether a settlor’s self-
settled trust in one state will be enforceable when the settlor’s state of 
residence does not have a statute allowing self-settled trusts. 
E. The Conflict of Laws Issue 
In essence, courts are faced with a choice of law issue, namely, 
whether to enforce the law where the trust was formed or to enforce the law 
of the forum state where the suit is filed.87 The body of law that 
	
84 See id. at I.  
85 See Howard B. Young, Recent Court Decisions Impacting Enforceability of Domestic Asset 
Protection Trusts Suggest Using Hybrid Domestic Asset Protection Trust Structure, MICH. ASSET 
PROTECTION LAW. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.michiganassetprotectionlawyerblog.com/2015/03/
recent-court-decisions-impacti.html [https://perma.cc/M6NR-PNKU]. 
86 For example, in Dahl v. Dahl, the court did not have to reach the question of whether the 
domestic asset protection trust was enforceable because it held that the trust was not a domestic asset 
protection trust, but actually a revocable trust, per the actual language found in the trust instrument. 
345 P.3d 566, 579–81 (Utah 2015), amended & superseded Nos. 20100683, 20111077, 2015 WL 
5098249 (Aug. 27, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 239 (2015). 
87 A federal bankruptcy court will typically apply the choice of law rules of the forum jurisdiction. 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). This Note will focus on the 
cornerstone of choice of law rules found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Although 
there is not uniform acceptance of Second Restatement principles, outliers and nuanced state conflicts 
laws exceed the scope of this Note, and the First Restatement’s principle of territorialism provides the 
obvious conclusion that a state’s territory ends at its border. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 
in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Survey, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 299 (2015) 
(providing an overview of recent cases and the choice of law rules those courts employed in a variety of 
states). 
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encompasses this choice of law question is known as conflict of laws.88 
While contracts typically provide choice of law provisions, competing state 
interests allow courts to select one state’s law over another.89 Simply put, 
conflict of laws typically dictates “when and why a law other than the 
forum court’s laws should be applied.”90 
The cornerstone of conflict of laws is found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, which has shaped the conflict of laws model 
in America today.91 The general policy regarding conflict of laws is 
outlined in § 6 of the Second Restatement, which outlines the aspects to be 
considered when making a choice of law decision: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) 
the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the 
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.92 
These considerations have merged into what is commonly known as the 
“center of gravity test.”93 This test guides the court in selecting the state 
with the “most significant relationship” to the issue in question.94 As we 
will see, and as many commentators have noted, the “virtue and . . . vice 
[of this test] lie[s] in its almost infinite flexibility.”95 
The Second Restatement elaborates further on the application of § 6 to 
trusts. Section 270(a) states that a trust is valid when: 
under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to govern the validity 
of the trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the trust and 
that the application of its law does not violate a strong public policy of the 
	
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW. INST. 1971); see also NORMAN 
M. ABRAMSON, SUSAN GARY, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 294, at 46 (3d ed. 2014). 
89 ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 224, at 46. 
90 Id.  
91 See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72, at 227 (4th ed. 2013). For various cases applying the 
Second Restatement, see, for example, Pounders v. Enserch E & C, Inc., 306 P.3d 9, 11–14 (Ariz. 
2013); Shoen v. Shoen, 292 P.3d 1224, 1227 (Colo. App. 2012); W. Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. 
VitalWorks, Inc., 78 A.3d 167, 192–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 322 Conn. 
541 (2016). 
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971). 
93 ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 224, at 49. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (citing Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1047 
(1987)). 
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state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant 
relationship under the principles stated in § 6.96 
There are two important points to parse out from § 270(a) that will 
determine the choice of law. First, this section notes that the domestic self-
settled trust state must have a “substantial relation to the trust” in order to 
govern the validity of the provisions.97 The comments to § 270 explain the 
definition of substantial relation as when a state: 
which the settlor designated as that in which the trust is to be administered, or 
that of the place of business or domicil of the trustee at the time of the creation 
of the trust, or that of the location of the trust assets at that time, or that of the 
domicil of the settlor, at that time, or that of the domicil of the beneficiaries.98 
Essentially, there is not one outcome-determinative element, but several 
factors that courts consider. 
The second consideration found in § 270 is that the domestic asset 
protection state’s law will be honored unless the particular issue violates a 
“strong public policy” of the state with which, as to the issue at hand, the 
trust has its most significant relationship.99 That is, the law of the pro-
domestic asset protection state will apply even if the law would violate a 
strong public policy of the forum state, as long as the domestic asset 
protection state has the most significant relationship under the principles 
previously stated in § 6 of the Restatement (for example, needs of the 
interstate and international systems, relevant policies of the forum, etc.). 
Interestingly, as this Note will explore further in Part III, other than the 
trustor’s domicile, the other factors in § 6 weigh in favor of honoring the 
choice of law provision selected by the settlor even if doing so offends the 
public policy of the non-domestic asset protection state. 
In addition to the above considerations found in § 270, which the 
Huber court utilized, a court should also consider another Restatement 
provision: § 273. This provision addresses restraints on alienation of 
beneficiary interests and provides: 
	
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1971). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. § 270 cmt. b; see also 7 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK 
L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 45.4.2.1, at 3234–42 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SCOTT & 
ASCHER] (discussing the validity of trusts, including the substantial relation language, when the law is 
designated by settlor). 
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see Monrad 
G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 
1015 (1956) (noting that the rejection of foreign law on public policy grounds occurs when the law 
“violate[s] the strongest moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust at the forum”). 
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[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of [an inter vivos] trust of movables is 
assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . by the 
local law of the state, if any, in which the settlor has manifested an intention 
that the trust is to be administered, and otherwise by the local law of the state 
to which the administration of the trust is most substantially related.100 
While the Huber court did not consider this provision, this Note will 
later argue that it is potentially the most crucial provision for a correct 
choice of law analysis. 
II. THE IN RE HUBER DECISION 
Against the backdrop of the previous section, we now consider the 
only existing case to directly address the question of how a court in one 
state will handle a domestic asset protection trust created under the law of 
another state: In re Huber.101 This case involved a Washington real estate 
developer who formed an Alaskan domestic asset protection trust in 
anticipation of potential personal liability on a business loan.102 To protect 
several of the properties pledged against the loan from foreclosure, the 
developer placed the vast majority of his assets—including development 
projects, his home, real estate properties, and monetary assets—in the 
protected trust.103 
Several years later, the real estate developer and settlor of the 
domestic asset protection trust declared bankruptcy.104 However, given that 
he had placed many of his assets in the protected trust, his creditors filed 
suit to enforce the judgment against those assets in bankruptcy.105 The 
primary question106 for the Washington bankruptcy court was whether to 
apply the law of Alaska—a pro-domestic asset protection law—or the law 
	
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (emphasis 
added). 
101 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. WD. Wash. 2013). 
102 Id. at 802–03. 
103 Id. at 805. 
104 Id. at 806.  
105 Id.  
106 The court put forth three different rationales as to why the protections of the trust should not 
succeed. Id. at 807–16. The foremost question considered in this Note is whether the trust, which was 
governed by domestic asset protection law and administered there, should be void on the grounds that 
non-domestic asset protection trust law should apply. For a discussion on bankruptcy-related issues 
pertaining to domestic asset protection trusts, see Richard W. Nenno, Planning and Defending 
Domestic Asset-Protection Trusts (ALI-CLE Course Materials, Apr. 22–27, 2012), WL ST041 ALI-
CLE 375, 501–19. Additionally, although the court could have held narrowly and focused solely on the 
fraudulent transfer issue or that much of the assets were real estate, the court instead broadly and 
incorrectly employed choice of law principles. See infra Part III. 
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of Washington, which did not have a statute allowing domestic asset 
protection trusts.107 
In considering the choice of law question, the court looked to § 270 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, focusing specifically on the 
aforementioned comment b of § 270.108 The court held that the debtor’s 
choice of law, Alaska, did not have a substantial relation to the trust.109 In 
coming to this conclusion, the court considered three factors: (1) whether 
the trustee or settlor was domiciled in the state, (2) whether the assets were 
located in the state, and (3) whether the beneficiaries were domiciled in the 
state.110 Conversely, the court found that Washington had a substantial 
relationship to the trust because the debtor, creditors, and many of the 
assets were located there.111 
Next, the court indicated that Washington also had a strong public 
policy against enforcing self-settled asset protection trusts.112 The court 
pointed to similar decisions in the context of offshore asset protection 
trusts, such as In re Portnoy, in which the court relied on public policy in 
applying New York law instead of the law of the offshore jurisdiction.113 
Referencing Portnoy, the court stated, “[a]s with New York, Washington 
has a policy that a debtor should not be able to escape the claims of his 
creditors by utilizing a spendthrift trust.”114 In this light, the court ultimately 
found that Washington law applied, and therefore, the trust was not 
protected from the settlor’s creditors.115 
III. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS FOR DOMESTIC  
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 
Choice of law issues have consistently presented difficult “choices,” 
both for courts and for scholars. Unfortunately, the court in Huber applied 
the doctrine in a manner inconsistent with existing theory and practice. 
Although this Note offers a substantive critique of the Huber decision’s 
choice of law analysis, the goal of this Note is not simply to assess Huber, 
but more broadly to articulate the correct choice of law analysis for the next 
court that faces a similar choice of law decision at the bankruptcy, district, 
	
107 Huber, 493 B.R. at 807. 
108 Id. at 807–09; see supra notes 91–100 and accompanying text.  
109 Huber, 493 B.R. at 808. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 808–809. 
112 Id. at 809. 
113 Id. For a discussion of In re Portnoy, see supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
114 Huber, 493 B.R. at 809.  
115 Id. 
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or—even more likely—appellate level. In light of this, the Huber decision 
is the best mechanism with which to illustrate the correct choice of law 
analysis. 
A. Trustor Intent and “Substantial Relationship” 
First, although the Huber court correctly considers § 270 of the 
Restatement, it incorrectly glosses over one of the most important tenets of 
trust law: the intent of the trustor. At least one federal court of appeals has 
specified that choice of law questions should begin with “the premise that 
the Restatement reflects a strong policy favoring enforcement of choice of 
law provisions.”116 In addition, historically, trustor intent was always given 
a high level of deference.117 As long as the trustor provided a provision 
within the trust expressing the controlling choice of law, courts complied 
with the will of the trustor.118 In addition, the Restatement presents a strong 
statement detailing the importance of trustor intent: 
The chief purpose in making decisions as to the applicable law is to carry out 
the intention of the creator of the trust in the disposal of the trust property. It is 
important that his intention, to the extent to which it can be ascertained, 
should not be defeated, unless this is required by the policy of a state which 
has such an interest in defeating his intention, as to the particular issue 
involved, that its local law should be applied.119 
That is, the focus of the court should be the intent of the trustor. More 
specifically, courts should find ways of enforcing the intent of the trustor as 
opposed to looking for avenues to thwart specific provisions provided in 
the trust instrument. Furthermore, the two leading treatises on trusts 
similarly adopt this de facto rebuttable presumption that trustor intent 
should be granted some degree of deference, with one leading treatise 
calling the intent of the settlor, as expressed in the trust instrument, the 
“only important consideration.”120 Intent is not the only consideration in 
determining a contentious choice of law issue. However, as more and more 
	
116 Green v. Zukerkorn (In re Zukerkorn), 484 B.R. 182, 192 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).  
117 See Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S. 542, 548 (1884); Liberty Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. New England 
Inv’s Shares, 25 F.2d 493, 495 (D. Mass 1928); Shannon v. Irving Tr. Co., 9 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 
1937). 
118 See WALTER W. LAND, TRUST IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 118–19 (1940). 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 10, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW. INST. 
1971).  
120 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 98, § 44.1, at 3053–54 (“In the making of a contract, the parties 
necessarily have conflicting interests, whereas, in the creation of a trust, the settlor’s intention is the 
only important consideration, except to the extent that public policy is to the contrary.”); see also 
ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 301, at 108. 
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courts are faced with decisions similar to Huber, they must not overlook 
this basic tenet of trust law. 
While the court in Huber ignores the underlying importance of trustor 
intent, the next choice of law consideration, per § 270, is whether the 
settlor’s choice of law has a substantial relation to the trust.121 The 
Restatement provides that a state has substantial relation to a trust if (1) it is 
the state designated by the testator, (2) it is the place of business or 
domicile of the trustee at the time the trust was created, (3) it is the location 
of the trust assets at the time the trust was created, (4) it is the domicile of 
the settlor, or (5) it is the domicile of the beneficiaries.122 As mentioned 
above, as long as the trust instrument explicitly states the domestic asset 
protection-friendly state law shall apply, as it did in Huber, then the first 
factor establishes a substantial relationship, per the Restatement. Further, 
the fact that the Restatement places trustor intent first and foremost when 
listing considerations is no accident. It simply validates the importance of 
trustor intent historically, as mentioned earlier, which also aligns with its 
application in choice of law issues.123 Giving even further credence to this 
argument is the approach of the Uniform Trust Code, which, although not 
as widely utilized, applies the law selected by the testator and states that 
“[t]he jurisdiction selected need not have any other connection to the 
trust”124—emphasizing the overlying importance of intent within choice of 
law decisions.125 
Interestingly, the court in Huber—though purporting to apply the 
Restatement definition of substantial relationship mentioned above—
completely disregards the actual Restatement and its comments.126 Had the 
court considered, per the Restatement comments, that the trustor 
	
121 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971). As the 
comment to the Restatement notes, this list is not exclusive; there may be other considerations that 
influence whether or not a state has a substantial relation. Id.  
123 See First Nat’l Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, 389 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 
(Mass. 1979); Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).  
124 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  
125 For an overview of the Uniform Trust Code application and approach to this choice of law issue 
generally, see Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: Uniform Trust Code, Sections 107 and 403, 
67 MO. L. REV. 213 (2002). 
126 In Huber, the court cites three considerations mentioned in an earlier case: “(1) the trustee or 
settlor is domiciled in the state; (2) the assets are located in the state; and (3) the beneficiaries are 
domiciled in the state.” 493 B.R. 798, 808 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (quoting Green v. Zukerkorn (In 
re Zukerkorn), 484 B.R. 182, 192 (9th Cir. B.A.P 2012)). There are two inherent problems with this 
selective interpretation of the Restatement’s definition of substantial relationship. First, the comments 
explicitly list four considerations and note that they are not exclusive. Second, the cited and paraphrased 
list does not mention that the case cited, Zukerkorn, actually states that the intention of the creator of the 
trust should be given great import. 484 B.R. at 192. 
111:205 (2016) In States We “Trust” 
225 
specifically named Alaska in the actual trust instrument in addition to the 
fact that the trustee and his business was located in Alaska, the court likely 
would have found a substantial relationship.127 Still, the court in Huber 
correctly noted that neither the trust assets nor the trust beneficiaries were 
located in Alaska.128 Yet, this fact is of little consequence given that case 
law consistently holds that one of, if not the most important factor when 
determining if a trust has a substantial relation to a state starts with the 
choice of law provision itself—not the location of the trust assets or the 
trust beneficiaries.129 In this case, both the choice of law provision and the 
location of the trustee and his business favored finding that Alaska had a 
substantial relationship with the trust. 
B. Strong Public Policy and Most Significant Relationship 
Public policy, it would seem, is the default well from which all courts 
drink when strict legal analysis would otherwise call for the enforcement of 
a self-settled trust.130 That is, beginning with the decisions in Portnoy and 
Brooks,131 courts have consistently relied on the amorphous public policy 
exception found in § 270 of the Restatement to invalidate asset protection 
trusts. Section 270 states that “provided that this state has a substantial 
relation to the trust and that the application of its law does not violate a 
strong public policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the 
trust has its most significant relationship.”132 
One interesting aspect of the Restatement § 270 public policy 
provision is that it sets up a precondition before courts even consider 
whether it is violative of public policy: the public policy exception is only 
considered as to the state where the trust has its most significant 
relationship—a separate consideration from the previous paragraph. While 
Huber completely glosses over this prerequisite,133 scholars have noted that 
it is central to the choice of law decision and that the domestic asset 
	
127 Additionally, the trust met all of the prerequisites of Alaska law: (1) be irrevocable; (2) 
expressly state that Alaska law governs the validity, construction, and administration of the trust, and 
(3) include a spendthrift provision. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015).  
128 493 B.R. at 808–09. 
129 See, e.g., supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
130 See Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the 
Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 767–77 (1999) (discussing the problems with Portnoy and 
others regarding their public policy analyses).  
131 For a discussion on these cases, see supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.  
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
133 Huber cites to Restatement § 270, yet moves straight to the public policy analysis without any 
consideration of the actual principles or text of the Restatement—in this case the “significant 
relationship” test. See 493 B.R. at 807–09. 
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protection state (Alaska, in the case of Huber) has the most significant 
relationship.134 The Restatement (in addition to the Uniform Trust Code) 
outlines several factors courts must consider in determining the state with 
the most significant relationship. A court is to consider: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) 
the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the 
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, 
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.135 
In considering the above-stated factors, one scholar noted that the 
“trustor’s domicile is only one factor that warrants consideration and that 
most of the other factors weigh in favor of honoring the designation of 
domestic [asset protection trust] state law.”136 Thus, that scholar 
acknowledged that the other factors embrace the importance of testator 
intent.137 As discussed in the previous section, testator intent should be the 
primary focus for any debate on determining a state’s relationship to a 
trust.138 Moreover, concerns within the factors of: 
certainty, predictability, and uniformity also point to finding the domestic 
[asset protection] state’s relationship more significant than other states. 
Although courts elsewhere may only occasionally deal with domestic [asset 
protection states], and thus have limited need to address the laws governing 
trust funds held by such trusts, domestic [asset protection] state trustees and 
their many trustors and beneficiaries have a constant need to know which 
body of law governs their rights and duties.139 
If courts continue to apply this endgame approach by not finding that 
the asset protection state has the most significant relationship, they 
blatantly disregard the spirit of the conflict of laws factors.140 Thus, it is 
evident that—at the very least—courts must not ignore this “significant 
relationship” portion of Restatement § 270 because it is not as clear as the 
conclusory assumptions that the Huber court would have one believe. 
	
134 See Nenno, supra note 106, at 456–57. 
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
136 Nenno, supra note 106, at 458. 
137 Id.; see id. at 447 (“[T]he fundamental objective of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
is to carry out—rather than to defeat—the testator’s or trustor’s intent.”). 
138 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
139 Nenno, supra note 106, at 478. 
140 Id. 
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Although Huber failed to include any discussion addressing the 
necessary prerequisite to using public policy to determine the state with the 
most significant relationship to the trust, the court still relied heavily on the 
public policy portion of the Restatement, stating “Washington State has a 
strong public policy against self-settled asset protection trusts [and] 
[s]pecifically, . . . transfers made to self-settled trusts are void as against 
existing or future creditors.”141 The court also noted that statutory 
disapproval of self-settled trusts has been in place for over a century.142 
Additionally, the court cited Portnoy to convey that this holding is in 
solidarity with the various other states that have found that self-settled 
trusts violate public policy.143 
There are several problems with the court’s public policy analysis 
under Restatement § 270 that require correction. First, the court ignored the 
crucial detail that it was the first to consider domestic self-settled asset 
protection trusts. By contrast, Portnoy considered an offshore self-settled 
trust.144 This point is made clearer, as noted by prominent Law Professor 
Douglas Laycock, given the original objective motivating the “strong 
public policy” language within the choice of law rules: 
Traditional approaches to choice of law contain an even more offensive 
variation on better-law approaches. This is the rule that the forum can reject 
sister-state law on the ground that it too deeply offends the public policy of 
the forum. This is the extreme case of better-law rules. Texas would reject 
California law not just because Texas law is better, but because California law 
is so offensive that it cannot be tolerated in a Texas court. Texas can reject the 
law of Libya in this high-handed way, or even the law of Alberta, and it may 
occasionally need to do so. But it cannot so treat a sister state admitted to the 
Union on an equal footing with itself. The public-policy exception is a relic 
carried over from international law without reflection on the changes in 
interstate relations wrought by the Constitution.145 
Professor Laycock outlines the importance of recognizing that this 
particular exception came directly for the purpose served in decisions like 
Portnoy.146 In these types of cases, when laws from foreign jurisdictions are 
	
141 493 B.R. 798, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 138 P.2d 653 (Wash. 
1943)). 
142 Id.  
143 Id. (citing Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
144 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
145 Laycock, supra note 76, at 313 (footnotes omitted). 
146 Id. (recognizing that there is an inherent difference between selecting a foreign law over a 
domestic one versus simply choosing one state’s law over the other). 
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so counter to American jurisprudence, an exception for strong public policy 
should be available. Yet, in Huber, the court relied heavily on Portnoy 
despite an important distinction between Portnoy and Huber: in Portnoy 
the choice was between foreign law and domestic law—not domestic law 
and domestic law.147 The court erroneously concluded that applying Jersey 
Channels law should receive the same consideration as applying Alaska 
law.148 As Professor Laycock suggests, the court is essentially trying to fit a 
square peg into a round hole when it applies Portnoy to a case of domestic 
law versus domestic law. Professor Laycock goes even further by outlining 
a specific example of courts making outcome-driven decisions: 
Unlike a federal trial judge sitting in California, Texas judges have no realistic 
experience of California law on which to base a judgment that a particular 
precedent is ripe for overruling. More important, Texas judges have a strong 
temptation to predict that California would now adopt the Texas rule that they 
consider more enlightened. This temptation may be especially strong if a 
Texas citizen would benefit. Even though the ideal is for a Texas court to 
decide the case as a California court would decide it, we may achieve that goal 
more often with a prophylactic rule that the courts of one state cannot predict 
change in the law of another state.149 
Professor Laycock hits the nail on the head. This public policy 
exception was not created so that one state could superimpose its state’s 
laws on another state. While one state may prefer self-settled trusts, another 
may not. Sixteen states currently allow self-settled trusts around the 
country.150 Allowing these trusts is not a legal principle found in one outlier 
state.151 
Yale conflict of laws scholar Professor Lea Brilmayer sheds light on 
states’ rationale for applying their own law, identifying potential political 
considerations, rather than actual choice of law principles.152 Professor 
Brilmayer notes that a common thread in modern conflict of laws is the 
“forum[’s] preference for its own law because of the supposed duty of a 
forum court to further the interests of its elected superiors.”153 However, she 
continues by stating “[w]hat the state wants is irrelevant to whether it has a 
	
147 Compare Huber, 493 B.R. at 809 (choosing between domestic and domestic law), with Portnoy, 
201 B.R. at 699 (choosing between domestic and foreign law). 
148 Huber, 493 B.R. at 809.  
149 Laycock, supra note 76, at 314–15 (footnote omitted).  
150 See SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I. 
151 If this were the case, perhaps the strong public policy exception could be utilized. However, it is 
not. See id.  
152 See Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, 1987 BYU L. REV. 949, 971. 
153 Id.  
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right to be interested.”154 In other words, according to Professor Brilmayer, 
state preferences should not guide courts, but rather, courts should heed 
applicable choice of law considerations. 
In fact, the above argument carries even more weight in light of the 
literature regarding potential choice of law issues and gay marriage. 
Professor Andrew Koppelman argues, similarly to Professor Laycock, that 
applying the overreaching public policy of the forum jurisdiction violates 
principles of federalism by “deliberately subverting the legitimate 
operation of the laws of other states” in favor of the public policy of the 
forum state.155 That is, the “strong public policy” bar is a high one which 
should not be used merely to apply the law that one court views as 
preferable. 
In light of this literature, if we assume that gay marriage must be 
accepted by its sister states (i.e., it does not violate a strong public policy of 
the forum state), a domestic asset protection trust should then easily pass 
the public policy test.156 Unlike gay marriage, a controversial moral and 
philosophical issue with extensive legal tentacles meandering into other 
areas of law, domestic asset protection trusts are simply a type of self-
settled vehicle, which are already in place in most states. For example, 
many states, such as Washington, already have strong public policies 
favoring broad freedom in allowing people to pass their property to 
others.157 Many states exempt individually funded retirement accounts and 
other tax-qualified retirement setups from creditors and bankruptcy 
estates.158 Moreover, many states allow instruments like life insurance, 
homestead exceptions, and annuities to survive creditors’ actions even 
	
154 Id.  
155 Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
921, 943 (1998). Other scholars have gone so far as to argue that the public policy exception is entirely 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).  
156 Additionally, similar to this Note’s thesis regarding the economic benefits of self-settled trusts, 
many scholars have commented on the potential economic benefits of gay marriage. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex 
Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 831–33 (1995); Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and 
Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 90 (1998). However, this Note argues 
that the economic benefits of domestic asset protection trusts present an even stronger case. See 
discussion infra Section IV.B.  
157 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 6.13 (2016) (homestead exemption); id. § 6.15.020(3) 
(retirement and annuity exemptions). 
158 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13–54–102(s) (2016) (exemption for funds held in retirement 
plans, including accounts that qualify as employee pension benefit plans under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)); cf. Employee Retiree 
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2012) (“Each pension plan shall provide that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”). 
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though they are self-settled.159 Thus, not only does the forum state—in 
Huber, Washington—not have a strong public policy reason for 
disallowing asset protection trusts, but many of their laws actually favor 
more testator and trust settlor freedom. In contrast, in many states, the vast 
majority of citizens morally oppose gay marriage based on religious or 
philosophical beliefs.160 In light of this, if we assume the literature arguing 
that gay marriage should pass the strong public policy test, domestic asset 
protection unequivocally should. 
C. The Correct Choice of Law Analysis: § 273 
While the above analysis considered § 270, the primary goal of this 
Note is to point out to future courts that § 270 is not even the correct 
provision courts should utilize. Interestingly, neither the court in Huber 
nor, surprisingly, the defendant,161 discuss the correct Restatement 
provision. That is, both the court and the defendant incorrectly considered 
§ 270 when the correct analysis should have been determined under § 273. 
While § 270 outlines potential questions regarding the validity of a 
trust, it is § 273 which determines the efficacy of alleged restraints on 
alienation.162 Both the courts and some scholars163 have confused the issue 
of validity with the issue of whether or not a creditor can pierce the trust 
and reach the assets.164 Section 273 states explicitly that: 
	
159 See BUIST M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON LIFE INSURANCE § 21.4, at 608 (1991); PETER SPERO, 
ASSET PROTECTION ¶ 10.09, at 10-100 n.611 (1994); Eason, supra note 47, at 64–70. 
160 See David B. Oppenheimer, Alvaro Oliveira & Aaron Blumenthal, Religiosity and Same-Sex 
Marriage in the United States and Europe, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195, 196–97 (2014).  
161 Defendant Donald G. Huber’s Response to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. 12–04171). Although at 
least one author has noted that § 273 should apply to self-settled trusts in offshore jurisdictions, see 
Rothschild et al., supra note 130, at 768–69, it is important to differentiate the application of § 273 
regarding domestic self-settled trusts versus those formed offshore. While both domestic and offshore 
trusts likely include a provision designating which law will govern, because offshore trusts do not have 
equivalent public policy benefits as those formed domestically, courts are more likely to ignore § 273 
and apply § 270 and its public policy limitation. Thus, contrary to scholars who argue against domestic 
asset protection trusts, offshore trusts may carry more risk regarding this underlying public policy 
exception given the inherent differences between applying offshore versus domestic law. See 
supra notes 145–151 and accompanying text. 
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
163 Some scholars present the issue as simply a § 270 question, with no consideration to the 
important, if not exclusive, role § 273 plays. See, e.g., Michael A. Passananti, Domestic Asset 
Protection Trusts: The Risks and Roadblocks Which May Hinder Their Effectiveness, 32 ACTEC J. 
260, 267 (2006). 
164 In trust law, the validity of the trust is a narrow concept, defined by the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 269. That section states that the validity of a trust addresses questions such as 
whether the trust violates the rule against perpetuities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 269 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
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[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of a[n] [inter vivos] trust of movables is 
assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . by the 
local law of the state, if any, in which the settlor has manifested an intention 
that the trust is to be administered, and otherwise by the local law of the state 
to which the administration of the trust is most substantially related.165 
Unlike § 270, there is no caveat for a state’s strong public policy found in 
the language of § 273 or in the Restatement comments. Indeed, there are no 
stipulations or additional requirements at all.166 The only considerations are 
(1) the intent of the settlor, and if that is unclear, (2) which state has the 
most substantial relationship to the trust.167 
In the case of Huber, as previously discussed, there was an express 
provision designating Alaska,168 and even if that was not the case, Alaska 
still had the most substantial relationship.169 Still, at least one trust treatise 
has considered whether § 273 still has an implicit public policy 
stipulation.170 This raises the question of whether, even when considering 
§ 273 rather than § 270, courts would simply claim that there is an 
embedded public policy exception in § 273 which is fundamental to all 
choice of law considerations. While this is a potential concern, given that 
§ 270 does have an explicit public policy exception, it seems unlikely that 
§ 273—which does not have one—was intended to have an implicit 
exception. More likely, there was a specific decision made not to include 
the public policy exception in § 273. Additionally, courts would still have 
to grapple with the express notion in § 273 that the applicable law should 
be determined by the intent of the settlor in the trust instrument, which 
seems a tough hill to climb. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
While the above choice of law discussion demonstrates that 
established conflict of laws principles should find domestic asset protection 
trusts enforceable, two broader arguments reveal the positive implications 
of allowing these trust instruments: (1) public policy and (2) the economic 
	
165 Id. § 273 (emphasis added). 
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). Notably, most 
similar trusts will likely have an express provision designating the domestic asset protection state as the 
state whose laws will govern.  
169 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
170 See SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 98, § 45.7.1.2, at 3350–51 (discussing the possibility of an 
implicit public policy provision with § 273). 
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and political theory of interstate federalism. Each will be discussed below 
in turn. 
A. Public Policy 
In 1995, not one state allowed domestic asset protection trusts.171 
Twenty years later, sixteen states—and counting—have passed legislation 
allowing these trusts.172 This Note argues that, similar to the widespread 
adoption of spendthrift trusts,173 more states will recognize the many public 
policy benefits of allowing these domestic asset protection trust 
instruments. 
First, asset protection created to guard against potential future 
creditors is not a new invention. In fact, there are a host of asset protection 
vehicles which already provide nearly identical protection to domestic 
asset protection trusts. For example, employees can place assets into 
creditor-proof retirement accounts.174 Similarly, while some scholars have 
argued that it is “disturbing . . . [to] allow debtors to leave their debts 
unpaid and still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle,”175 other asset protection 
vehicles already provide the protection which so many scholars claim is 
disturbing. These vehicles include “tenancy-by-the-entirety property, 
family limited partnerships, limited liability companies, homesteads, life 
insurance policies, annuity contracts, and transfers to cooperative friends or 
family members.”176 Nevertheless, some business owners and individuals 
are not able to take advantage of these other vehicles; thus, domestic asset 
protection trusts simply even the playing field. 
In the same light, as mentioned in the introductory hypothetical, 
domestic asset protection trusts would provide business owners with 
protection from potential tort liability. In 2008, the overall price tag for tort 
litigation for small business owners was $105.4 billion.177 Small businesses 
were burdened, however, with 81% of the litigation costs and only 22% of 
	
171 See discussion supra Section I.C. 
172 See SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I. The most recent additions are Ohio in 2013 and Mississippi in 
2014. Id.  
173 Spendthrift trusts were once controversial, yet they have now achieved nearly widespread 
acceptance in the United States. Nienhuser, supra note 43, at 554.  
174 See Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 689–90 (4th Cir. 1983). 
175 See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
1195, 1259 (2000).  
176 See Passananti, supra note 163, at 262. 
177 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORT LIABILITY COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 1 
(2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ilr_small_business_2010_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2AB-7L9W]. 
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the revenue.178 Frivolous tort lawsuits are a continual drain on small 
business resources in the United States, and domestic asset protection trusts 
could help solve this problem, while also making sure, through fraudulent 
conveyance statutes and other means, that businesses are not cheating the 
system. Not only would domestic asset protection trusts allow small 
business owners to protect against these lawsuits, but presumably, these 
owners would shift those assets back into the economy—producing an 
additional economic benefit.179 
The second public policy argument supporting domestic asset 
protection trusts is the economic benefit the United States would receive—
a benefit currently enjoyed in offshore jurisdictions. In 2004, the Treasury 
Department estimated that “tens of billions” of dollars of assets were held 
in offshore asset protection trusts.180 Additionally, according to one 
analysis, over 100,000 Americans created these offshore trusts between 
1994 and 1999.181 This information demonstrates that by not allowing 
domestic asset protection trusts, the United States has stimulated an exodus 
of wealth to offshore jurisdictions. Alternatively, if this capital remained in 
the United States via domestic asset protection trusts, the United States 
economy—through attorneys, financial advisors, potential tax revenue, and 
other means—would greatly benefit.182 Moreover, allowing these offshore 
assets to move into similar vehicles in the United States will bring more 
economically productive uses, such as reducing the litigation battles 
currently fought to bring those offshore assets back to the United States. 
	
178 Id. at 9. Additionally, small businesses paid $35.6 billion of these tort costs out of their own 
pocket. Id. 
179 See id. at 6 (discussing research that demonstrates the economic benefit small businesses would 
otherwise provide to the economy without the fear of frivolous lawsuits); Lloyd Dixon et al., The 
Impact of Regulation and Litigation on Small Businesses and Entrepreneurship: An Overview, in IN 
THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP? THE LOGIC AND EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT 
FOR SMALL BUSINESS 17 (Susan M. Gates & Kristin J. Leuschner eds., 2007) (noting the uphill 
economic battle of small businesses who face prolonged litigation); see also discussion infra Section 
IV.B. 
180 Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Protection 
Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561, 569 n.31 (2004) (citation omitted); see also David Leigh, 
Billions Hidden Offshore: Jersey Faces Tax Clampdown, GUARDIAN, Sept. 26, 1998, at 1 (noting that 
billions of British pounds were hidden in offshore British tax havens in 1998). 
181 See William C. Symonds, Offshore Trusts: Not So Watertight, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 1999, 
11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1999-07-25/offshore-trusts-not-so-watertight 
[https://perma.cc/E8HG-NWEX]. Additionally, it is estimated that tens of thousands of new offshore 
trusts are created every year. See Gary P. Kaplan, Use of Offshore Trusts, ARNOLD & PORTER (Apr. 28, 
2008), http://www.arnoldporter.com/es/perspectives/publications/2008/04/use-of-offshore-trusts 
[https://perma.cc/26XU-WELW]. 
182 Further, most domestic asset protection statutes mandate that one trustee be chosen from that 
particular state and that a certain percentage of the assets be managed from within the state—providing 
additional incentives for state legislatures to implement these statutes and boost their economy. See 
Passananti, supra note 163, at 261, 263. 
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Ultimately, allowing domestic asset protection trusts provides clarity within 
the legal process with regard to these instruments, where courts can limit 
abuse and potential fraudulent activity because the trusts will be created 
and administered within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
B. Interstate Federalism 
In addition to general public policy implications, courts that disregard 
choice of law principles in favor of their own states’ public policy norms 
ignore (1) the constitutional underpinnings and (2) economic benefits of 
interstate federalism—specifically the financial importance of interstate 
competition. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution sets the 
boundaries on a court’s autonomy in applying the law of one state versus 
another.183 The Clause reads: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.”184 Essentially, the laws of one state must be given equal respect by 
the other forty-nine. States have different laws, but no state has inherently 
better laws than the others. With regard to interstate federalism, we must 
consider two related ideas: (1) whether interstate competition through 
domestic asset protection trusts is in agreement with or jeopardizes notions 
of interstate federalism found in the Constitution, and (2) whether interstate 
competition benefits the United States economically. That is, we have both 
a normative question—what should states be doing according to the 
constitution—and a descriptive one—is it actually benefiting the United 
States? 
This analysis must begin with the Constitution itself and whether it 
envisions interstate competition rather than a protectionist environment 
between states. First, as mentioned above, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
states that the laws of one state must be given equal respect by the other 
forty-nine—no state has fundamentally better laws than the others.185 
Second, the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandates that people from 
one state be treated equally to citizens from any other state,186 thus 
promoting interstate movement and commerce. Third, the Commerce 
Clause precludes states from implementing trade barriers and also forbids 
	
183 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that full faith and credit requires “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally 
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”). 
184 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
185 Id. 
186 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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interstate agreements without congressional approval187—thwarting any 
interstate anticompetitive practices. Finally, the Contract Clause, which 
prohibits states from impairing contractual obligations,188 further facilitates 
interstate competition by evening the playing field between states. The 
inherent competitiveness planted in the DNA of the Constitution is 
obvious: the Founders envisioned not only relations between states but 
competition. 
Importantly, the competitive business environment envisioned by the 
Founders harmonizes with the economics of interstate competition, 
particularly in the choice of law field. Enforcing contractual choice of law 
provisions—like the one in Huber—fosters more efficient jurisdictional 
competition between and among states. Although the roots of interstate 
competition and its benefits can be traced to the economist Friedrich von 
Hayek in the 1940s,189 Charles Tiebout provided the basis for modern 
research in the late 1950s.190 Tiebout’s model analogized political 
competition to competition in the private market by considering the 
benefits provided in the form of taxes and service by competing political 
jurisdictions.191 He demonstrated two related benefits, which have been 
borne out in further research.192 First, interstate competition between 
different jurisdictions forces elected officials to recognize the economic 
and political consequences of their choices.193 Second, given that citizens’ 
preferences differ, interstate competition leads to an ideal combination of 
goods, services, and laws across jurisdictions.194 The host of literature 
expounding the benefits of interstate competition is vast.195 For example, 
	
187 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
188 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
189 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255 (1948).  
190 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) 
(asserting that public expenditures would be allocated more efficiently through competition between 
localities). 
191 Id. at 419–20. 
192 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 571 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein, eds. 1987). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS (1996); ALBERT BRETON & 
ANTHONY SCOTT, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS 13–19 (1980); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, 
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. 
ECON. 333 (1988); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); Judge Ralph Winter, Private 
Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 127 (1982). However, 
there are those that would debate the benefits of interstate competition. See, e.g., Dennis Epple & Allan 
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literature noting the benefits of this “race to the top” of competitive 
federalism arose in regard to state legislatures recognizing gay marriage.196 
Scholars noted the economic advantages from recognizing same-sex 
marriages in light of jurisdictional competition.197 This illustrates the long-
term economic benefits—regardless of the issue—of promoting a climate 
of interstate competition between states. 
Although interstate competition is rooted in our Constitution’s DNA, 
and the normative literature establishes the economic benefits of interstate 
competition, it is harder to ascertain the actual monetary benefit flowing 
into the individual states and the United States generally by recognizing 
domestic asset protection trusts. Here, Professors Max Schanzenbach and 
Robert Sitkoff’s empirical study on jurisdictional competition and trust 
assets is instructive.198 
In their empirical analysis, Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff first 
and foremost considered the rule against perpetuities. Unlike the domestic 
asset protection trust—first enacted in 1997—several states abolished the 
rule against perpetuities before 1986, giving the authors a wide time frame 
to study the economic effects.199 Based on the study, they found that a 
state’s abolition of the rule against perpetuities increased trust assets by 
more than six billion dollars, as much as a twenty percent increase.200 
Moreover, the average trust account grew by at least $200,000.201 Although 
the authors noted that the benefits accruing from jurisdictional competition 
were not felt in tax revenue, the findings fall in line with this Note’s 
argument that jurisdictional competition positively affects states.202 In 
particular, state interest groups, from lawyers to accountants to other 
	
Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. 
POL. ECON. 1197 (1981); Sterk, supra note 20, at 1055–74. 
196 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 156, at 831–33; Solimine, supra note 156, at 87–91. Although 
opponents may argue a “race to the bottom” will ensue, American legislatures, unlike many foreign 
jurisdictions, do not eliminate fraudulent conveyance statutes, thus still allowing liability for 
fraudulently enacted trusts. See Hans Christian Beyer, When Worlds Collide: The Dubious Value of 
U.S. Judgments in Offshore Jurisdictions in 2 ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES 433 (Alexander A. 
Bove, Jr. ed., 2005); see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2014). This mitigates much of the worry that a race to the bottom could follow and only 
makes the economic arguments that much stronger. 
197 See supra note 156.  
198 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 20. 
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200 Id. at 410. 
201 Id. at 409. 
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professionals, benefit from an increase in trust business.203 Moreover, in 
trustee commission alone—assuming standard yearly costs—trust assets 
bring in more than a billion dollars a year to states.204 
While Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff did not reach the same 
overall conclusions regarding the number of trust assets arising from states 
validating domestic asset protection trusts, they hypothesized that 
“jurisdictional competition in trust law appears ready to focus next on” 
domestic asset protection trusts.205 At the time of their study, only a few 
states had enacted domestic asset protection trust statutes.206 Today, that 
number is up to sixteen—and counting.207 Moreover, synthesizing 
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff’s article with the Treasury statistics 
noting “tens of billions” of dollars currently in offshore trusts,208 this Note 
hypothesizes that (1) those assets have begun to flow back into domestic 
asset protection states over the last eleven years since the publication of the 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff article and (2) the benefits accruing to states 
since the abolition of the rule against perpetuities has begun to similarly 
accrue to domestic asset protection trust states. 
The above discussion sets out the positive benefits from interstate 
competition of domestic asset protection trusts. Now, the question is 
whether courts will not only employ the correct choice of law analysis, but 
also recognize the federalism-related repercussions and possible economic 
benefits of domestic asset protection trusts. Only time will tell. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate that the first court to consider the application of 
choice of law principles to domestic asset protection trusts badly missed the 
mark. Accordingly, courts must not use Huber as a benchmark. Not only 
did it incorrectly consider the Restatement choice of law principles found 
in § 270 and completely ignore § 273, but if followed, its conclusory public 
policy analysis would wreak havoc on other areas of the law. Allowing 
forum jurisdictions to apply their own law because of political or economic 
partiality sets a dangerous precedent. Moreover, the Constitution 
demonstrates the Founders envisioned competition between the 
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jurisdictions, not an environment which promotes protectionism. Similarly, 
economic and public policy considerations support the choice of law 
outcome. Domestic asset protection trusts already exist in alternative forms 
within nearly every state around the country. Furthermore, interstate 
competition is in line with the Constitution and promotes economic growth. 
Consequently, the decision for future courts is an easy one. The law is 
clear. The policy is clear. Domestic asset protection trusts, regardless in 
which state they are settled, should be enforced. 
 
